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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the Court of Appeals misapply the facts and issue

a decision in conflict with case law from this Court and another
panel of the Court of Appeals in reaching its decision that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to excuse a
juror for cause who indicated she had been the victim of a similar
crime and evidenced an emotional reaction to that crime?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals reach a decision in conflict

with this Court's decision in State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277 (Utah
1980), in its determination that the unauthorized contact between
the bailiff and jurors did not raise a presumption of prejudice?

iii

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury, of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GALEN L. JONAS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No.
Priority No. 2

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 880411-CA
Priority No. 2

GALEN L. JONAS,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jonas,
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Case No. 880411-CA, filed May 22, 1990), is
attached hereto as Appendix A.

On June 19, 1990, Petitioner timely

filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals.

On June 27,

1990, the Court of Appeals denied Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing.

A copy of that Court's order denying the Petition for

Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on May 22,
1990.

After timely requesting and receiving an extension of time,

Appellant filed his Petition for Rehearing on June 19, 1990. The
Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari must be filed.
Appellate Procedure.

Rule 48(c), Utah Rules of

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is

therefore timely filed pursuant to Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp.
1988).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-412(1)(b) (1978); Theft by
Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-412(1)(c) (1978); and Theft by
Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-412(1)(b) (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
Judge, presiding.

After a trial held on April 20, 21, 22 and 25,

1988, a jury convicted Mr. Jonas of the three counts and the
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah rendered final judgment and
conviction.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State charged Mr. Jonas with seven counts of Theft by
Receiving; following a four-day trial, a jury convicted him on three
of those counts.
The charges arose out of a number of incidents involving
a police informant, Jim Prater, and an undercover agent,
Sgt. Illsey.

As the Court of Appeals set forth in its opinion at

3-4, these incidents involved an undercover police officer selling
various items to Mr. Jonas.

The officer was large, with a

distinctive appearance, and had arrested Mr. Jonas in the past.
Mr. Jonas' defense to the charges was that he knew
officers were setting him up in a "sting" operation, recognized
Sgt. Illsey from the prior arrest, and therefore knew the items were
not stolen.

Mr. Jonas also involved a different officer, Officer

Brown, by requesting that Officer Brown double check that the items
were not stolen and to witness an incident where, according to
Mr. Jonas, undercover agent Illsey was planning to sell drugs.
The jury apparently was persuaded by Mr. Jonas' defense
that he did not believe the items were stolen in assessing the four
later counts and finding him not guilty on those counts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH
MISAPPLIES THE FACTS, IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING
CASE LAW. AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION
RENDERED BY ANOTHER PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

In reaching its decision that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause,
this Court determined that the jurors responses did not raise an
inference of partiality or prejudice.

State v. Jonas. 135 Utah Adv

Rep. 38, 41-2 (Case No. 880411-CA, filed May 22, 1990).

The Court

focused on the juror's statement that she might be "a little"
influenced if the case involved tools and determined that
This case did not involve tools, so it could be
inferred that the prior experience did not
influence her at all.
Id. at 41. The Court's decision ignores the juror's later statement
that it probably would be difficult for her to be impartial.
40.

Id. al

It also ignores the obvious fact that both the crime in which

the juror had been a victim and the crime before the Court in the
instant case were theft related.

It further fails to take into

account her repeated expressions of concern that she would be biasec
and her emotional response to police officers' failure to get the
tools back.

Id. at 40-1.
In State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), this Court

held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse
for cause two jurors who had been victims of a burglary.

This Court

stated:
Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional
response, there is posed a warning that the juror
may not have a mental attitude of appropriate
indifference to the party or cause before the
court . . . [B]ased on the juror's expressed
feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the trial court
must determine by a process of logic and reason,
based upon common experience, whether the juror
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can stand in attitude of indifference between the
state and the accused.
Id. at 884.
In State v. Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (1990), an
opinion issued three days after the opinion in the instant case, a
different panel in the Court of Appeals, comprised of Judges Orme,
Davidson and Billings, reversed a criminal conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial based on the trial judged failure to
excuse for cause a juror who gave inconsistent responses to similar
voir dire questions in two separate courtrooms.

The defendant in

Suarez filed an affidavit from the defense attorney in another case
which indicated that the juror at issue had indicated in the other
courtroom that he was biased in favor of police testimony.

Relying

on State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984), and State v.
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980), a panel of the Court of
Appeals determined that the juror should have been excused for
cause.

Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66.

In Suarez, the juror

indicated to the trial judge that he would not be biased in favor of
police officers.
no bias.

The juror's answer on its face, therefore, showed

The Court of Appeals, however, relied on an affidavit

filed by the defense lawyer in the other case in which the juror had
been questioned to reach its decision that the juror should have
been excused for cause.
Given the statements by the juror in the present case
that it would probably be difficult for her to be fair and her
emotional response to the theft, the result in Suarez should also
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have also occurred in this case.
This Court also determined that even if an inference wer
raised, the juror's subsequent responses showed that her concern wa
merely the product of a "light impression" and not one that would
"close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in
opposition [citation omitted]."

On the contrary, her final

statement acknowledged her emotional reaction to the incident.
Furthermore, after numerous other statements which indicated an
emotional reaction to the fact the police "didn't do anything" and
that she still had not gotten her possessions back, and a repeated
concern that she might be influenced by the incident, a single
statement by the juror that she believed she could be impartial doei
not "attenuate the earlier expressions of bias."

See Jonas. 135

Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (contained in Appendix A) for transcript of
juror's voir dire response.
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Jones. 734
P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), citing State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878, 88<
(Utah 1981):
When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of
bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or
she can render an impartial verdict cannot
attenuate the earlier expressions of bias.
In this case, where the juror stated that she had been
the victim of similar crime and indicated an emotional response to
that prior incident, the trial judge abused his discretion in
failing to excuse her for cause.

Mr. Jonas respectfully requests

- 6

-

that this Court grant his Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this
issue.

POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE
FACTS AND EXISTING CASE LAW FROM THIS COURT IN
DECIDING THAT THE CONTACT BETWEEN THE JURORS AND
BAILIFF DID NOT RAISE A PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE.
In the instant case, after both parties had rested but
before instructions or closing arguments were presented to the jury,
the bailiff had an unauthorized and inappropriate exchange with the
jurors.

The parties had rested on a Friday, and over the weekend,

the pregnant sister of one of the jurors was shot during a highly
publicized video store robbery.

The bailiff told the jurors that

Juror Davis' sister had been murdered in the video store robbery and
that Juror Davis had been excused from the panel.

(Transcript of

July 6, 1989 at 3-4). The jurors were not aware of the information
prior to the bailiff's discussion.
During trial, Mr. Jonas made a Motion for Mistrial based
on the unauthorized contact.

(Transcript of April 25, 1988 at 5).

Mr. Jonas argued that the contact raised a presumption of prejudice
pursuant to State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985).
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that "the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors before the jury began
deliberating was an incidental contact raising no presumption of
prejudice."

Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43.

In his opening brief, Mr. Jonas argued that the contact
raised a presumption of prejudice under Pike.
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Although there is disagreement as to the
specifics of what the bailiff said to the jurors
in this case ( . . • ) , the information which is
included in the transcript establishes that the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was
more than brief and incidental and went beyond
mere civilties. At the very least, the bailiff
informed the jurors of the reason that another
juror had been excused. He made them aware that
the juror's sister had been murdered in a highly
publicized incident that had occurred over the
weekend.
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors
of a reason for excusing another juror was outside
his role as a bailiff and went beyond any
permissible contact that might be allowed as part
of his duties in shepherding the jury. The
statement tended to heighten the jurors7 awareness
of crime in the community and would give rise to
all of the reactions, fears and concerns that
people feel when considering society's current
level of criminal activity. The nature of the
information was far more intense and of a more
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a
conversation about a bunged toe or a witness'
job. In addition, any follow-up commentary by the
jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific
incident or crime in general, none of which was
recorded but which it is reasonable to assume
occurred, could have a significant prejudicial
impart on a criminal defendant whose case was
currently being tried.
Information to the jurors regarding the
reason for excusing Mr. Davis should have been
carefully controlled. Instead, the bailiff
imparted the information in a completely
uncontrolled situation where Mr. Jonas and his
attorney had no opportunity to hear what was said
and no opportunity to have input or comment on the
information or to object to it being conveyed.
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as
an extension of the court and because his position
is that of a court official, his statements carry
great weight. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
[363 (1966)] at 365. Furthermore, he has a
responsibility to monitor and control his actions
and statements while in the presence of the jury
so as to not taint them. Since the bailiff's
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contact with the jury as a whole went beyond one
of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice was raised by his
unauthorized comments.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 27-8. This argument is based on the
facts and circumstances of the instant case and is not merely an
assumption that the presumption was raised.
The State agreed in this case that the presumption was
raised, stating:
Despite being a brief and a natural outgrowth of
the relationship between bailiff and jury, it is
reasonable to classify the encounter as one in
which a rebuttable presumption of prejudice would
rise.
State's Brief at 45.
Both of the reasons for the rule, as articulated in Pike,
712 P.2d at 279-80 (Utah 1980), are applicable to this situation
where the bailiff had unauthorized contact with jurors.

First, it

is inherently difficult to prove the effect of the contact on the
juror, and second, the appearance of impropriety causes a
deleterious effect upon the judicial process.

Because the bailiff

is an extension of the court and wears an emblem of authority, he
has a greater potential for impact on a juror than many witnesses.
The Court of Appeals states that "[t]here was no exchange
at all because the jurors said nothing."

Jonas. 135 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 43. The facts in this case do not support such a statement; the
bailiff was not asked and did not volunteer information regarding
the statements or physical reactions made in response to the
information.

Mr. Jonas contends that the State had the burden of
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establishing lack of prejudice once the presumption arose; the Stat
failed to establish that the jurors said or did nothing in response
and this Court erroneously determined that no such exchange occurre
Although the truth of the bailiff's statement is not at
issue, its impact on the jurors is.

If jurors were discussing high

crime rates or emotional reactions to crime with the bailiff, or
even among themselves, in response to the bailiff's information,
they were impacted by the information.
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court grant hi:
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this issue and determine that thi
Court of Appeals erroneously decided that a presumption of prejudic<
was raised in this case and that the State failed to rebut that
presumption.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court grant his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and review the issues addressed
herein.
SUBMITTED thisC* /

day of July, 1990.
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APPENDIX A

„

Charlesworth v. i ate of California

£2

UliittlL Y. Rep. 36

ered on appeal. See Zions First Nat'l. Bank v.
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655
(Utah 1988). The ationale advanced in the dissenting
opinion concerning lack of full inquiry concerning
the children's circumstances and appropriateness of
the visitation order, would have equal application in
a separate URESA action, but because of the
limited jurisdiction under that act, would clearly be
irrelevant.
3. See Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987),
where the supreme court held that child support
payment could not be conditioned upon the noncustodial parent's obtaining visitation. See also
McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (per curiam).
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
I take no serious issue with the majority's
view of the law generally applicable to cases
brought under URESA. And I would take no
issue with the result my colleagues reach if an
independent URESA action had been commenced simply to recover sums paid by California for the support of the subject children.
This is not such a case, however, and accordingly I do not join my colleagues in reversing
the trial court's disposition, which I believe
was appropriate under the circumstances.
First, it is important to emphasize that relief
was not sought in an independent action. On
the contrary, a petition bearing the caption
and case number of the underlying divorce
action was filed in that case on behalf of
defendant Blanca Charlesworth. The petition
purported to show California as an additional
defendant although leave of court was neither
requested nor obtained to add an additional
defendant to the underlying action. Accordingly, while California no doubt had a claim
on any recovery that might be obtained and
clearly was the impetus behind the effort to
collect support, the only defendant properly
before the court was defendant Blanca Charlesworth.
Not only did California seek enforcement of
a support obligation in a pending divorce
action over which the court had continuing
jurisdiction as a matter of statutory law, see
Utah Code A n n . §30-3-5(3)0989), but in
addition it chose to pursue the matter in the
context of a case where the court's prior
decree had expressly ''held in abeyance until
the further order of the Court" the issue of
child support. This provision seems to have
been prompted by defendant's inappropriate
action in concealing her whereabouts and that
of the children, as a result of which no meaningful evidence could be obtained about the
children's circumstances and Blanca's ability
t o contribute to their support. In addition to
being unable to intelligently set a level of
support payments to be made by plaintiff, the
court n o doubt hoped that the lack of support
payments from plaintiff might smoke Blanca
out,, require her to come forward, and permit
the court to have access to the information

CODE«CO
Pr<m>.ut«h
necessary to determine an appropriate level o f
support.
The trial court remains thwarted in its effort
to receive meaningful evidence relative to the
children's circumstances and necessary to its
determination of an appropriate level of permanent child support to be paid by plaintiffs
It remains thwarted in its ability to enforce the
"reasonable visitation" it also decreed in favor
of plaintiff. At least in the context of the
divorce action over which the court has continuing jurisdiction-and this is the context
in which California chose to raise the issue—
I think the court has the power and discretion
to balance the parties' respective legal obligations in the way it did: Plaintiff has a legal
duty to pay towards the support of his children; defendant has the legal duty to make the
children available for reasonable visitation.
Moreover, the court is entitled to consider
evidence about the children's circumstances so
it can get the question of child support out of
"abeyance" and fix as part of its divorce
decree an appropriate amount for plaintiffs
discharge of his ongoing support obligation.
A n order directing defendant to make minimal
support payments to be held by the clerk, with
disbursement to follow when the children are
found, best accomplishes these purposes.
California sought to enforce a support
obligation which had advisedly been held in
abeyance. It sought to d o so in the context o f
a divorce action over which the court has
continuing jurisdiction as to a wide range of
issues. Whatever might have been appropriate
in the context of an independent URESA
action, the order entered by the court in this
divorce proceeding was appropriate and I
would affirm it.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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ST*-***
umiabjj
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt May.
There was no essential difference in the
Lake City, for Appellee
State's
evidence regarding each of the seven
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and
transactions. The' police conducted a sting
Larson.1
operation. On each occasion charged, an
undercover police officer sold, and defendant
OPINION
purchased, various merchandise, consisting
principally of equipment and appliances that
JACKSON, Judge:
the police had purchased beforehand or that
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding was unclaimed evidence in police custody.2 In
him guilty of three counts of theft: (1) theft by each instance, the officer posed as a thief or
receiving, a third-degree felony, in violation fence selling stolen goods for about ten cents
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (Supp. on the dollar. He usually wore an audio rec1989) and §76-6-412(b) (1978), on July 17, order and some transactions were videoreco1985, and (2) on July 30, 1985, and (3) theft rded. These recordings were played and subby receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in viol- mitted to the jury. The police documented the
ation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 goods sold and the monies defendant paid.
(Supp; 1989) and §76-6-412(c) (1978), on
Defendant does not dispute the State's
July 25,1985. We affirm.
evidence. Instead, he claims that he knew the
Defendant seeks reversal of the convictions property, he received in July 1985 was not
or a new trial on five grounds: (1) insufficient stolen. Thus, he asserts that he did not have
evidence; (2) failure to excuse a prospective the culpable mental state that is a necessary
juror for cause; (3) a bailiffs allegedly impr- element of the crime charged. Utah Code
oper contact with jurors; (4) failure of the Ann. §76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1989) provides,
court reporter to provide an accurate transc- with our emphasis:
ript of the evidentiary hearing on a motion for
A person commits theft if he
mistrial; and (5) denial of a motion to recuse
receives, retains, or disposes of the
the trial judge. We will review each of defenproperty of another knowing that it
dant's challenges in turn.
has been stolen, or believing that it
probably has been stolen, or who
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
The standard of review of a jury verdict
concealing, selling, or withholding
challenge based on insufficiency of the evidany such property from the owner,
ence is as follows:
knowing the property to be stolen,
[W]e view the evidence presented
with a purpose to deprive the owner
and all inferences that can be drawn
thereof.
therefrom in the light most favorDefendant testified that he recognized as a
able to the verdict. Where there is
police officer the undercover agent who sold
any evidence, including reasonable
him the merchandise in July 1985. Defendant
inferences that can be drawn from
also
testified that he knew before all of the
it, from which findings of all the
transactions that the property was not stolen.
elements of the crime can be made
He claimed that this knowledge was based on
beyond a reasonable doubt, our
information provided to him by two persons,
inquiry is complete and we will
James Lawrence Prater, a confidential police
sustain the verdict.
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 informant, and defendant's acquaintance,
(1989) (citations omitted). Stated another way, Officer Brown. Defendant and his wife testiwe will reverse a jury conviction for insuffic- fied that Prater told them in July 1985 about
ient evidence only when the evidence, viewed the sting operation but said "not to worry
in the light most favorable to the jury's about it, that the merchandise was not
verdict, "'is sufficiently inconclusive or inhe- stolen." Prater had arranged the first meeting
rently improbable that reasonable minds must between defendant and the undercover officer.
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Prater was not available at trial to corroborate
defendant committed the crime of which he or rebut the conversation testimony. On the
was convicted.'" State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d other hand, Officer Brown did testify. Brown
1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting Stare v. stated that in the fall of 1985, after the July
transactions, defendant told him that he had
Markham, 750 P.2d 599,601 (Utah 1988)).
been introduced by Prater to a man who had
In August 1986, defendant was charged with some damaged warehouse property that he
seven counts of theft by receiving arising out would sell cheap to defendant. Defendant told
of separate transactions in 1985 and 1986. Brown he thought Prater might be an underFour of the transactions occurred in July cover officer or an informant. Defendant's
1985. There were no transactions between July next contact with Brown was on March 29,
30, 1985, and March 4, 1986. The three 1986 1986, when he directed Brown to an anticiptransactions took place in March, April, and ated drug transaction which did not materia-
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MR. YENGICH: -exclude Juror
lize. In May or June 1986, defendant spoke to
Number-prospective Juror No. 6.
Brown again. He showed Brown some propShe is the lady that indicated she
erty and asked Brown to check the national
had been burglarized in the past
computer system, NCIC, to see if it was
and initially said—
stolen. Brown remembered seeing an air
THE COURT: Ten or twenty years
compressor, saw blades, and a television.
before, wasn't it?
Defendant also gave Brown some serial
MR. YENGICH: Well, I don't
numbers to check out. Brown reported to
know. The record will speak to
defendant that those items were not stolen.
that. She indicated initially an indBrown believed that the checking on NCIC
ication that she did not think she
was done before defendant's arrest on August
could be fair and impartial and I at
1> 1986. But police records indicated only one
the ben(ch] excepted to her as indNCIC check by Brown, on August 14,1986.
icating an implied bias of that parDefendant was convicted on the 1985
ticular juror and I used a perempcharges and acquitted on the 1986 charges.
tory challenge to strike her.
The jury could have chosen to disbelieve defTHE COURT: The record may so
endant's story about the 1985 Prater convershow.3
sation, his recognition of the property seller as
a police officer, and his knowledge about the
Defendant's exception was based on the
status of the property at the time he received it following voir dire colloquy between the trial
in July 1985, even if they accepted defen- court and juror Smith:
dant's and Brown's testimony regarding defTHE COURT: All right. I almost
endant's knowledge or belief regarding the
hate to ask this question, but I'm
unstolen status of the property he received in
obligated to. Have any of you been
1986. The jury, not the appellate court, perfthe victims of a theft? And that, as
orms the function of determining the credibiI've indicated to you before what a
lity of a witness's testimony. State v. Lactod,
theft
really is, taking property of
761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A
another with intent to permanently
person may be convicted of theft by receiving
deprive them, or in receiving. Well,
even if the property is not in fact stolen prowe'll
take that first. I saw some
perty, State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173
hands
go
up in the jury box.
(Utah 1985), if the State proves that the defAll
right.
Mrs. Smith? I assume all
endant acted under the belief that the property
you
women
are married unless you
was stolen. Id, at 1172. Unless evidence that
tell
me
otherwise.
supports the jury's verdict is so insubstantial
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
that the jury must necessarily have entertained
SMITH: Yes, my husband had
a reasonable doubt that the defendant comabout $13,000 worth of tools stolen
mitted the crime charged, we are obligated to
about a year and a half ago which
assume the jury believed the evidence which
we have never—
supports the verdict. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
THE COURT: Did a criminal act
878, 884 (Utah 1981). Nor will we overturn a
result from that-or action?
conviction merely because the jury chose not
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
to believe the defendant. Lactod, 761 P.2d at
SMITH: No, it was reported to the
27. There is substantial evidence from which
police, which they didn't do anytthe jury could reasonably conclude that defehing about, and we still have never
ndant, at the time of the July 1985 transactgottenions, believed that the property was stolen,
THE COURT: They didn't find it?
despite his self-serving assertion at trial that
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
he believed otherwise in July 1985. We thereSMITH: (shook head from side to
fore reject defendant's challenge to the jury's
side)
verdict.
THE COURT: How long ago was
that?
JURY SELECTION
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
'After the completion of jury voir dire,
SMITH: About a year and a half
defendant challenged one member of the
ago.
venire for cause. Defense counsel, in an unrTHE COURT: Keeping that incieported conference at the bench, excepted to
dent in mind, as I indicated, there
the trial court's denial of that request. The
are different parties involved, but
next day, defense counsel entered his exception
sometimes based on our experience
upon the record in the following form:
we allow that to interfere with our
MR, YENGICH: ... I failed-the
thinking.
Court allowed me to take exception
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
to the Court's failure t o SMITH: It might be. If it was
THE COURT: Make a record.
tools, I might be a little influenced.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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THE COURT: Weil, wait just a
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for
minute. Let me ask the questions
cause is addressed to the sound discretion of
and you just answer the question.
the trial court. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
459, 462 (Utah 1989). When reviewing such a
SMITH: All right.
ruling, we reverse* only if the trial court has
THE COURT: Bearing that in
abused that discretion by committing harmful
mind, do you believe that that incerror. Id. The general rule concerning abuse of
ident would make it difficult for
discretion is that the appellate court "will
you to be fair and impartial, partipresume that the discretion of the trial court
cularly to this Defendant, as well as
was properly exercised unless the record
the people of the state of Utah?
clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D .
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984);
SMITH: It's a little hard to say.
see State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah
THE COURT: Well, you just take
1985). An appellant has the burden of establtime to think it over because we—
ishing that reversible error resulted from an
you're the one thatabuse of discretion. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
439,448 (Utah 1988).
SMITH: It probably would, yes.
'A court commits prejudicial error if it
THE COURT: Let's see. You're
forces a party to exercise a peremptory challMrs.~
enge to remove a prospective juror who should
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782
SMITH: Smith, Donna Smith.
P.2d at 461; State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 1123,
THE COURT: You don't believe
1125 (Utah 1989); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451.
that you could set those facts aside
When comments are made by a juror which
and make a determination on the
facially bring into question that prospective
evidence that's presented in this
juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of
case?
discretion may occur unless the court or
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
counsel investigates further and finds the infSMITH: I-well, yes, I believe I
erence rebutted or dismisses the juror. See
could be impartial.
Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127.
THE COURT: We know you
The Cobb holding suggests a two-part
didn't like to lose the tools.
procedure. When the threshold of apparent
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
partiality or prejudice is crossed and an infeSMITH: No, I didn't.
rence arises, the court must determine from
Defendant's objection to prospective juror further inquiry of the venire member whether
Smith is based on Utah Rule of Criminal the inference is rebutted. Thus, our first queProcedure 18(e)(14) (codified at Utah Code stion is: Did Smith's initial comments raise an
Ann. §77-35-18(e)(14) (1982), repealed inference of partiality and prejudice on her
effective July 1,1990), which provides:
part as to this cause or this defendant? We
think not. She stated that the prior theft of
The challenge for cause is an objeher
husband's tools might influence her thinction to a particular juror and may
king a little, if this case involved tools. This
be taken on one or more of the
case did not involve tools, so it could be inffollowing grounds:
erred that the prior experience would not influence her at all. As the trial court pressed her
(14) that a state of mind exists on
further, she expressed some concern while
the part of the juror with reference
weighing her feelings about her ability to be
to the cause, or to either party,
fair but, upon final weighing, she expressed
which will prevent him from acting
affirmative belief in her impartiality. Juror
impartially and without prejudice to
Smith's mild initial responses are in stark
the substantial rights of the party
contrast to those of the two prospective jurors
challenging....
On appeal, defendant contends the trial in Stare v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981),
who crossed the Cobb threshold. They stated
judge committed reversible error by rejecting
that their strong adverse emotional responses
his challenge of Smith for cause. In his brief, as former crime victims would affect their
he summarizes this claim of error as follows:
thinking; Smith did not. They identified a
The trial judge abused his discretion
residue of personal trauma which would
in failing to excuse Juror Smith for
compromise their capacity for objectivity;
cause after she indicated that she
Smith did not. Their expressed states of mind
had been a victim of a crime similar
supported an inference that they could not act
to the crime charged and that she
with impartiality, defined as "a mental attitude
believed such experience would
of appropriate indifference" in Srate v.
interfere with her ability to be
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977), while
impartial.
Smith's expressed state of mind did not
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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support a similar inference.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that
Smith's initial comments raised on their face a
threshold inference of partiality and prejudice,
her subsequent responses to the judge's questioning show her concern was merely the
product of a "light impression" and not one
that'would "close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in opposition."
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451 (quoting State v.
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,768 (Utah 1980)).
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
grant defendant's request for removal of
Smith from the jury panel for cause.
BAILIFF CONTACT
The parties rested their presentations on
Friday, April 22, 1988, after four days of
trial. The trial court then scheduled jury instruction and closing arguments for Monday
morning, April 25. That weekend, a sister of
juror Davis was shot to death during a
robbery of a local video store. Juror Davis
informed the court on Monday morning that
he could not continue as a juror due to the
fact that his pregnant sister had been murdered. Upon stipulation of counsel, the court
excused Davis from further jury duty and an
alternate juror moved into Davis's place on
the jury. Davis, upon his departure from the
courthouse, asked the bailiff to explain his
absence to the other jurors, and the bailiff
then did so.
Defense counsel, upon learning of the
bailiffs contact with the jury, moved for a
mistrial because the bailiff "did inform them
of that." The court denied the motion without
prejudice. Later, the bailiff was placed under
oath and testified as follows about his contact
with the jury:
(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed
Bailiff HUGH BELL under oath,
who testified as follows:)
THE COURT: State your name.
THE WITNESS: Hugh Bell.
THE COURT: And you are
Deputy Sheriff?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Bailiff of this
court?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: This morning at
nine o'clock Mr. Davis came in and
stated reasons to the Court why he
would like to be excused from the
case, and would you tell us the
sequence of events that happened
after he left the chambers?
THE WITNESS: He came into
the courtroom and asked for statement of service on his jury duty and
I went to Joan, found where the
statement was, got her to fill one
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out for him, gave it to him. I
walked to the door and expressed
my sympathy to him and everything, and he asked me if I would
tell the rest of the jurors what
happened, why he was excused.
THE COURT: And what did you
do?
THE WITNESS: I went in and I
told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't
be in because his sister was the lady
that was shot out in West Valley.
THE COURT: Were they discussing the case or the incident at all
when you went in?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Did you ever hear
them discuss it?
THE WITNESS: They didn't
know a thing about it.
THE COURT: All right, you may
cross-examine.
MR. YENGICH: No crossexamination.
Defense counsel immediately renewed his
mistrial motion "on the basis of the record."4
Again, his motion was denied.
On appeal, defendant argues that, "by informing the remaining jurors that the trial
court had excused another juror and the
reason for that excuse, the bailiff interfered
with Mr. Jonas' right to a trial by an impartial jury," guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution.5 He relies
on the declaration in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d
277, 279-80 (Utah 1985), that "[anything
more than the most incidental contact during
the trial between witnesses and jurors casts
doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at
best gives the appearance of the absence of
impartiality." In Pike, an important prosecution witness (an arresting officer and eyewitness) engaged three jurors in conversation
about a personal incident. The Utah Supreme
Court concluded that a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice from the juror-witness contact
was established because "the conversation
amounted to more than a brief, incidental
contact and no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly
affect the juror's judgment as to [the
witness's] credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281.
Once such a presumption is raised, the court
reaffirmed, the burden is on the prosecution
to prove that the unauthorized contact did not
influence the juror.* Id. at 280; see State v.
Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State v.
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988).
Pike identifies two reasons for the rule that
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises
from a nonincidental witness contact with a
juror: (1) the inherent difficulty in proving
how or whether a juror has in fact been infl-
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uenced by conversing with a participant in the
trial, and (2) the deleterious effect upon the
judicial process because of the appearance of
impropriety from such contact. Pike, 712 P.2d
at 280.
In the instant case, the trial court did not
indicate whether the denial of defendant's
motion was based on a determination that the
contact was incidental or that the contact was
nonincidental, but the resulting presumption
of prejudice was rebutted. On appeal, defendant assumes that the contact between the
bailiff and the jurors was presumptively prejudicial because it was more than "a brief,
incidental contact where only remarks of civility were exchanged." Erickson, 749 P.2d at
620.
In light of the enunciated reasons for the
rule reaffirmed in Pike, we conclude that the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors
before the jury began deliberating was an
incidental contact raising no presumption of
prejudice. Erickson and Pike and all the other
Utah cases cited by defendant involved conversational contacts between a juror and a trial
witness. In such circumstances, it is appropriate to characterize any verbal contact beyond
mere civilities as nonincidental because it
might influence the juror's ability to assess
impartially the credibility of that witness.
Jurors should not, as a matter of course, talk
to witnesses about the case at hand or about
anything else. According to Pike, the substance of any such conversation does not dictate
application of the presumptive prejudice rule.
The rule is applied, first, because of the potential for the conversation's subtle effect on
the juror's ability to assess the credibility of
the trial participant with whom he has conversed. Here, however, unlike the jurorwitness cases relied upon by defendant, no
"conversation" took place, in the normal sense
of an "oral exchange of sentiments, observations, opinions, [or] ideas." Webster's Third
Int'l Dictionary 458 (1986). There was no
exchange at all because the jurors said
nothing. The bailiff merely conveyed information about why juror Davis would not be
present for the balance of the trial. In addition, the bailiffs credibility in the eyes of the
jury was not at issue. He did not testify. The
truth of his statement to the jury was not
relevant.
We think the facts in this case are more like
those in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355
P.2d 57 (1960), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 970
(1961). In Garcia, the contact occurred at the
same stage of the proceedings, i.e., after all
the evidence was in, but before the jury was
instructed or the case argued or submitted. A
juror approached the trial judge and privately
asked if the parties would introduce tapes of
certain testimony. The judge responded that
he did not know, but would advise counsel
that the juror had inquired. Our supreme

court pointed out that, "while in a sense the
juror's conversation with the trial judge was
on a subject connected with the trial," the
judge's response was not. Garcia, 355 P.2d at
59. Although it would have been improper for
the judge to discuss the issue with the juror,
the court stated, the judge's actual response
was proper. Id. The court saw "nothing about
this situation which would tend to prejudice
the defendant," distinguishing cases in which
prejudice was presumed from a contact
between a juror and a witness or interested
party during the deliberative process. Id.
Here, the bailiffs message to the jury had
an even more tenuous connection to the
subject of the trial itself than the verbal interchange in Garcia. Although it was not unintended, it was not the kind of communication
which would prejudice the jury's judgment
regarding their verdict in this case.
The second reason identified in Pike for
presuming prejudice is also absent here. Jurorprosecution witness contacts make the entire
judicial process look collusive or unfair to the
defendant. However, unlike verbal contacts
between jurors and trial participants, verbal
contacts beyond mere civilities between jurors
and a bailiff, about subjects other than those
connected with the trial at hand, are expected
and unavoidable since the bailiff is assigned to
minister to the jurors' needs and to be the
contact person. We do not believe that Pike
compels the conclusion that prejudice presumptively results when a bailiff says anything
other than "Hello" or "Good morning" to a
juror at a time when the case has not even
been submitted to the jury for deliberations.
Compare Utah Code Ann. §77-17-9 (1990)
(officer in charge of sequestered jury must not
speak with jury "on any subject connected
with the trial") with Utah Code Ann. §7717-11 (1990) (officer in charge of jury in
deliberations shall "not permit any person to
speak to or communicate with them or to do
so himself except upon the order of the court
...."); see Still v. State, 484 P.2d 549 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971) (unauthorized communication between bailiff and jury during its deliberations would raise presumption of prejudice).
This bailiff did not mingle with the jurors
or converse with them about the trial itself;
nor did he interrupt their deliberations. His
brief contact concerning something tangential
to the trial itself did not give rise to any appearance of impropriety. Thus, the trial court
could have properly concluded that the contact
was incidental and raised no presumption of
prejudice.
Because we conclude that the juror-bailiff
contact did not deny defendant his constitutional right to an impartial jury, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the
request for a mistrial. See State v. Spcer, 750
P.2d 186 (Utah 1988).
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from several other criminal prosecutions of
defendant while Judge Banks was prosecuting
attorney.
The trial judge examined the matter consistent with the rule, Utah R. Crim. P. 29, and
statutory procedure, Utah Code Ann. §7735-29(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July
1, 1990). The court compared defendant's
factual allegations with the court files in each
prior case. The court records demonstrated
defendant's affidavit to be factually inaccurate concerning the judge's direct involvement
in the several prosecutions, with one exception. The judge found that he had been personally involved in only one of defendant's
prior prosecutions. Regarding that case, Judge
Banks stated:

MOTION HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Defendant claims that his right of appeal
has been impermissibly impaired because the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing on his
mistrial motion is incomplete. Defense counsel
agrees that the bailiffs contact with the jury,
discussed above, was a basis for the initial
mistrial motion,7 which was denied without
prejudice. A hearing was later held concerning
the bailiff-jury contact, at which the only
witness called to testify was the bailiff. His
testimony, fully quoted above, was short and
direct and comported with defense counsel's
report of the jury contact when stated as the
ground for the initial motion. The bailiffs
testimony concerning the content of his
message to the jury did not give rise to a
[A] minute entry [is] endorsed on
presumption of prejudice. Thus, the inquiry
the Information showing that it was
ended, and when defense counsel renewed the
my motion to dismiss, and the
mistrial motion at the close of the testimony,
others, the only basis for any prejit was again denied. The transcript of the
udice would be that I was the Discourt's inquiry, the bailiff's testimony, I
trict Attorney and that people who
counsel's motion, and the court's ruling is 1
appeared in behalf of the State at
complete. That portion of the transcript has
the District Attorney's level were
no gaps and no indications of unintelligible
my deputies.
words. The indication "(illegible)" appears
solely in connection with statements of the
The judge concluded that the defendant's
court and counsel, which do not form the affidavit was factually insufficient and that
basis for defendant's claim that the jury was prejudice was not shown. The matter was
not impartial. Defense counsel's mistrial referred to another trial judge for review
motion was renewed on the "basis of the pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 29(d). That
record/ i.e., the bailiffs testimony.
judge denied defendant's motion to disqualify
The court reporters' transcripts are virtually Judge Banks and referred the case back to him
complete and thus amply adequate for us to for trial.
Defendant has failed to show any actual
review defendant's claims. This transcript is
not like the transcript in Stare v. Taylor, 664 bias requiring recusal. We consider State v.
P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), where a new trial was Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied,
ordered. There, a juror's responses to voir 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), to be controlling. In
dire questions were totally absent from the Neeley, Judge Banks, as prosecutor, had
record and could not be reconstructed. Here, signed some criminal informations against
the bailiffs testimony was totally reported, defendants and had appeared in court in one
and there was no need to reconstruct the case to accept a guilty plea. Based on those
record.1 We find the transcript before us to be facts, the court found no actual bias, as reqfunctionally adequate for review. Not all uired, and no grounds for reversal. The Utah
deficiencies or inaccuracies in the record Supreme Court stated:
require a new trial. State v. Perry, 401
Judge Banks determined that he
N.W^d 748, 752 (Wis. 1987). We conclude
had no actual bias against defenthat the condition of the transcripts did not
dant Belt by reason of his involvedeprive defendant of due process or of the
ment in Belt's prosecution some
right of appeal guaranteed by Article 1, section
twenty years prior. He then foll12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code
owed the statutorily mandated
Ann. §77-l-6(l)(g) (1990).'
procedure to determine whether
sufficient legal grounds existed to
TRIAL JUDGE RECUSAL
require his disqualification. While it
Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice
has been suggested that a trial judge
against Judge Banks, pursuant to Rule 29 of
disqualify himself whenever an
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. He
affidavit of bias and prejudice is
alleged that, twenty years earlier, the judge, as
filed against him in good faith, this
prosecutor, had been forced to dismiss certain
practice is not mandatory.
criminal charges against him. Defendant
claimed -the judge still harbored resentment Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. Continuing, th«
towards him arising from the dismissal. Def- Court stated:
endant asserted actual bias of the judge
against him, arising from that incident and
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Appellate counsel has not identified a seco
But, while we recommend the praground for our consideration. Trial counsel's al
ctice that a judge recuse himself
davit speculates that the purported second grou
where there is a colorable claim of
might have related to the prosecutor's closing ai
bias or prejudice, absent a showing
ument. But the transcript of closing arguments
of actual bias or an abuse of disccomplete, without gaps, and without indication
retion, failure to do so does not
an unintelligible word. Thus, any problem wi
argument could be identified by appellate couns<
constitute reversible error as long as
Again, none has been directed to our attentio
the requirements of section 77-35Moreover, the transcript reveals that defense couns
29 [Utah R. Crim. P. 29] are met.
did
not interpose any objection during the course >
Id.
the prosecutor's argument. Counsel has the unfei
In light of defendant's failure to establish ered opportunity to interrupt at any time at
actual bias or an abuse of discretion, Judge request that any portion of an argument be rec<
Banks did not commit reversible error by rded, and to voice any objection thereto he ma
desire. State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 921 (Uta
refusing to disqualify himself as trial judge.
1979). We conclude that the only actual ground fc
We affirm defendant's convictions.
the renewed mistrial motion was the bailiff
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
conduct.
8. Here, the trial court attempted to "settle th
WE CONCUR:
record" due to defendant's claims about omissions
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
However, those omissions were not related to th
John Farr Larson, Judge
material issues of this appeal as discussed in ou
analysis.
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 9. Defendant received, at State expense, a full an<
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah complete transcript of his trial consisting of severa
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
volumes. He takes no issue with the adequacy of th<
2. The merchandise purchased in the seven transac- transcripts except a portion of one volume tha
tions was, respectively, (1) Fischer VCR and contains instructions to the jury, closing arguments
Samsung TV, (2) Toshiba TV, (3) RCA and Magn- and the hearing on the mistrial motion. The coun
avox video recorders, (4) three microwave ovens, (5) reporter for these proceedings on the final day ol
chain saw, (6) grill, air compressor, and kerosene trial departed the state and could not be located tc
lantern, and (7) Fischer VCR.
prepare that part of the transcript. The reporter ai
3. Although defense counsel spoke of "implied all other trial proceedings prepared the entire tranbias/ the record indicates that the court and opp- script, utilizing the written notes of the missing
osing counsel understood that the legal basis of the reporter.
challenge to prospective juror Smith for cause was
"actual bias/ Subsections (e)(1) through (e)(13) of
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 state grounds of implied bias
or bias at law, i.e., bias arising from status. SubseCite as
ction (e)(14) sets forth actual bias, i.e., bias arising
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 45
from state of mind, as a ground for a challenge for
cause.
IN THE
4. See note 7, infra.
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
5. Although defendant mentions Article I, sections
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution in his appellate
brief, this issue was neither raised below nor adeq- STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
uately briefed or argued on appeal. We therefore
confine our analysis to the federal constitution. See
v.
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 51 n.4 Michael Lewis GREEN, aka James Alvin
(Ct. App. 1990).
Douglas,
6. This rule has its Utah roots in Stare v. Thome, 39
Defendant and Appellant.
Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911), in which two officers
took the jury to lunch at a public hotel in the midst
of their deliberations. One juror and one officer left No. 890222-CA
the group and the juror talked to someone on the FILED: May 23, 1990
telephone. The record did not show whom the juror
talked with or what was said. The court concluded:
First District, Box Elder County
Honorable Gordon J. Low
From the conduct disclosed and the
exposure of the juror to harmful influATTORNEYS:
ences, prejudice is presumed, and the
Daniel R. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for
burden cast on the state to show what
Appellant
the communication was, and that it was
harmless and could not have influenced
R. Paul Van Dam and Barbara Bearnson, Salt
or affected the deliberations of the juror
Lake City, for Appellee
or his verdict,
Before
Judges Bench, Greenwood, and
/d., 117 P. at 66.
Jackson.
7. Defendant's trial counsel filed an affidavit stating
that he "thinks" he might have had a second ground
for the renewed mistrial motion. If so, that ground
would appear in the transcript of the proceedings.
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 880411-CA

v.
Galen L. Jonas,
Defendant and Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 19, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this
FOR THE COURT

Mary T^/Nqonan, Clerk
•v-

day of June, 1990.

